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SUMMARY:

2.

FACTS:

,
1

~

•

1 J..

\nth

~- c.-c~ ~tension

The SG challenges CA 9 1 s conclusion that a portion of the

Crimes~!~=e~o ~X:~n!!4~u:~~:~~ ~
~-

In 1974 four men broke into a non-Indian 1 s house located on th e

'h\«. 1.41 Coeur d'Alene reservation. The four robbed the non-Indian and killed-;:: by~
~o;~! ~:: beating. Four enrolled Coeur d Alene Indians were indicted. Two of the men,
1

1

...__

Ckr\s

Antelope and L e onard Davison, were indicted of felonious entry of a non-Indian ho m •

-z j

on an Indian reservation in violation of 18 U.S. C. § 1153 and robbery in violation
of 18 U.S. C. § § 1153 and 2111.

Count II I of the indictment charged Antelope and

Davison, as well as William Davison and Seyler, with killing the woman in the
perpetration of th e robberyi.nvio1a.tion of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1153 and 1111.
granted immunity and testified at trial as a government witness.

Seyler \"':as

The jury found

Antelope and Leonard Davison guilty of all three counts, including first degree
murder under Count I I I.

William Davison was convicted only of the lesser inclu ded

offense of second degree murder on Count I I I.

-

Resps appealed their convictions on the grounds that the murder provision of
18 U.S. C. § 1153 was unconstitutional as applied to them.

They claimed that it

deprived them of equal protection and due process under the 5th Amendment

througl~

an invidious racial discrimination without a proper government objective.
CA 9 agreed with resps and reversed all three murder convictions.

It aff'd

the burglary and robbery convictions under counts I and I I as those had not been
challenged.
CA 9 first described the statutory framework governing crimes on Indian

land.

It noted that the crime of killing an Indian by an Indian (on Indian land) is

governed by the Major Crimes Act, 18 U.S. C. § 1153, which incorporates the
federal definition of murder, 18 U.S. C. § 1111.
including felony murder.

Section 1111 defines murder 1 as

The crime of killing an Indian by a non-Indian (on Indi an

land) is governed by the Federal Enclave Law, 18 U.S. C. § 1152, which also
incorporates 18 U.S. C. § 1111.

The crime of killing a non-Indian by an Indian (on

Indian land) is also controlled by§ 1153 and§ 1111.

However, the killing of a non-

Indian by a non-Indian in Indian country is a state crime.

For this last statement

CA 9 cited New York ex rei. Ray v. Martin, 326 U.S. 496 (1946); United States v.
McBratney, 104 U.S . (14 Otto) 621 (1881); and United States v. Cleveland, 503 F. 2d
l 06 7 (CA 9 1974).

Thus, when a non-Indian kills a non-Indian the definition of

murder is determined by reference to the situs state's law [and the case is tried
in state court].

The Idaho provision for murder l requires proof of premeditation

and deliberation.

In Idaho felony murder is murder 2.

[But murder 1 in Idaho

carries a mandatory death penalty.]
CA 9 then analyzed the equal protection claim as follows:

In Idaho it is

easier to get a murder l conviction under federal law than under state law because
no proof of the mens rea element of premeditation and deliberation is required.
Congress has granted to the federal courts jurisdiction of petrs
on the basis of their race.

11

1

CA 9 then said that petrs 1 argument

crime "solely
11

is not against the

grant of jurisdiction itself, but rather against the accompanying definition of murder.
CA 9 then said that "the sole basis for the disparate treatment of appellants and nonIndians is that of race.

11

(Emphasis in original).

CA 9 noted that in Gray v.

United States, 394 F.2d 96 (CA 9 1967), cert denied, 393 U.S. 985 (196 8), it
employed the doctrine of federal wardship in upholding the disparate sentencing
in rape cases.

It distinguished that case on the ground that there the disparity

mitigated the penalty for Indians raping non-Indians "and thus inured to the Indians'
ben efit.

11

-

--

Here CA 9 noted that the Indians were put at a disadvantage because

murder l was easier to prove under federal law.

CA 9 noted that it dismissed the

equal protection claim in Henry v. United States, 432 F. 2d 114 (CA 9 1970), ce r- t
deni ed, 400 U.S. lOll (1971) (which held that an Indian erroneously charged un d e r

§ 1152 for his rape of two non-Indians on an Indian reservation rather than under
§ 1153 was harmless error), on the ground that the law applied identical definitions

3 CA 9 cited New York ex rel. Ray v. Martin, 326 U.S. 496 (1946); Unit ed States v.
McBratney, 104 U.S. (14 Otto) 621 (1881); and United States v. Cleveland, 503 F.2d
1067 (CA 9 1974).

Thus, when a non-Indian kills a non-Indian the definition of

murder is determined by reference to the situs state 1 s law [and the case is tried
in state court].

The Idaho provision for murder 1 requires proof of premeditation

and deliberation.

In Idaho felony murder is murder 2.

[But murder 1 in Idaho

carries a mandatory death penalty.]
CA 9 then analyzed the equal protection claim as follows:

In Idaho it is

easier to get a murder 1 conviction under federal law than under state law because
no proof of the mens rea element of premeditation and deliberation is required.
Congress has granted to the federal courts jurisdiction of petrs 1 crime "solely
on the basis of their race.

11

CA 9 then said that petrs 1 argument "is not against the

grant of jurisdiction itself, but rather against the accompanying definition of murder.
CA 9 then said that "the sole basis for the disparate treatment of appellants and nonIndians is that of race."

(Emphasis in original).

CA 9 noted that in Gray v .

United States, 394 F. 2d 96 (CA 9 1967), cert denied, 393 U.S. 985 (1968), it
employed the doctrine of federal wardship in upholding the disparate sentencing
in rape cases.

It distinguished that case on the ground that there the disparity

mitigated the penalty for Indians raping non-Indians "and thus inured to the Indians'
benefit."

-

--

Here CA 9 noted that the Indians were put at a disadvantage because

murder 1 was easier to prove under federal law.

CA 9 noted that it dismissed the

equal protection claim in Henry v. United States, 432 F. 2d 114 (CA 9 1970), ce Yt
denied, 400 U.S. 1011 ( 1971) (which held that an Indian erroneously charged un d e :·

§ 1152 for his rape of two non-Indians on an Indian reservation rather than under
§ 1153 was harmless error), on the ground that the law applied identical definitions

- 4 of rape under either federal or Nevada law.

CA 9 then noted its holding in Mull v.

United States, 402 F.2d 571 (CA 9 1968), cert denied, 393 U.S. 1107 (1969), "that
when a statute does not subject the Indian defendant to any truly invidious racial
discrimination (i. e., when he is not put in a genuinely disadvantageous position),
it cannot be challenged on equal protection g J ounds.

11

Here CA 9 found that when

Indians are at a serious "procedural or substantive disadvantage'' the case is
different and one of first impression.
CA 9 found the rationale of United States v. Cleveland, 503 F. 2d 106 7 (CA o
1974), applicable.

In Cleveland under § 1152

a

non-Indian assaulting an Indian is

subject to the application of federal law in the federal court while under§ 1153
an Indian assaulting an Indian is subject to application of state law in the federal
court.

There the court noted that Indians were subject to more severe punishment

than non-Indians and thus upheld the dismissal of the indictments as unconstitutiona E:
discriminating against Indians.
CA 9 then noted that the question was complicated in this case by the

ab~enc e

of federal jurisdiction against the comparative group, non-Indians killing non-Indi an:::
But CA 9 held that the government cannot accomplish through discriminatory
jurisdiction what it cannot accomplish through discriminatory statutory coverage.
It held that discriminatory treatment here cannot be justified by the federal ward sl-.i ..

of Indians, citing Keeble v. United States, 412 U.S. 205, which held that Indians
must be given lesser included offenses charges even though the lesser included
offense is not expressly enumerated in the Major Crimes A ct.

Finally CA 9 held

that uniformity of federal law for multistate reservations is not a justification sin ce
for some of the crimes the Major Crimes Act incorporate

state law definitions.

- 5 3.

CONTENTIONS:

The SG contends that Congress may assert federal

jurisdiction with respect to offenses in which an Indian is involved as accused or

-

v ictim, leaving to states the prosecution of offenses involving only non-Indians
without violating equal protection.
The SG notes that while § 1152 on its face would apply to anyone committing
a crime on Indian country, court made law limited its application only to crimes
involving Indians.

(See the cases cited by CA 9 supporting its statement that there

is no federal jurisdiction for killing a non-Indian by a non-Indian.

The cases

justified the distinction on the ground that the state 1 s interest in enforcement of
its law as to its citizens overshadowed the federal interest in exercising its trust
responsibility over tribal Indians and their property.)

The SG then states that if

the line between federal and state jurisdiction is proper, then Congress need not
define crimes which are within its sphere of jurisdiction in conformity with state
law~·

The Constitution provides for congressional authority over Indian affairs

and provides that federal laws and treaties are supreme.
the

11

The SG contends that

discrimination 11 between Indian involved offenses and non-Indian offenses is

reasonable because of the constitutionally mandated responsibilities of Congress
with respect to matters involving Indians and the interest of the States in regulatin g
relations among non-Indian citizens.
The SG contends the legislative

11

discrimination 11 is not racial.

The

separate treatrnent of Indian affairs is a result of the Indians 1 former sovereignty
and the United States 1 subsequent trust relationship.

A person can cease being a ::.

Indian legally, although not racially, by severing his ties with the tribe.

Canadi an .

South American and North American Indians of terminated tribes would not be

- 6 considered India n s in this context.

Additionally, any Indian or non-Indian tried

for murder under federal court jurisdiction (under§ 1152 or 1153) is subject to
the definition of § 1111.

I

It is only if both the accus eel and victiln are non-Indians

that the result differs, but that is due to a recognition that state jurisdiction rather
than federal governs the crime.
The SG then distinguished Keeble and Cleveland (although not necessarily
conceding that Cleveland is good law) on the ground that both involved differential
treatment of Indians as opposed to non-Indians, both of whom were subject to
federal jurisdiction for the same crime.

Here one is subject to federal and the

other to state jurisdiction.
The SG contends this decision will lead to uncertainty in applying law to the
major offenses.

The SG contends that federal courts will have to apply a patchwork

I

law, taking the most lenient provisions from the state and federal laws relating
to the same offenses.

Here, the SG notes that while Idaho does not include felony

murder as a murder 1 offense, Idaho has a mandatory death penalty for murder 1
offenses which this federal crime does not.

Therefore, had premeditation been

proved, should the death penalty have applied?

Presumably not.

Additionally it

is often difficult to determine what provisions of substantive and procedural law
are more

11

lenient.

11

It might also lead to application of a combination of federal

and state law that is more lenient than either one.
in law enforcement on their reservation.

Finally, Indians have an interest

A requirement of

11

leniency 11 does not

further that interest.
The SG contends that the decision substantially affects law enforcement in
/

some n1ajor areas of the

col~ntry.

CA 9 includes many reservations.

(Those in

- 7 California are unaffected by this decision however because P. L. 280 makes state
criminal law applicable within all the reservations of that state.)
Finally the SG contends that if Indians and non-Indians cannot be punished
in different jurisdictions applying different laws, then the Court should reconstrue

§ 1152 and have it apply to anyone who commits a crime in Indian country, regardless of th e identity of the accused or victim.
In a footnote the SG notes that CA 9 rev'd the conviction of all three men,
although one of them was convicted of murder 2, not murder 1.

The SG notes that

the prob.l em with the statutory scheme as seen by CA 9 only involved murder l and
thus t he third conviction should not have been reversed.

The SG does not find that

error in<portant enough to seek cert on however.

4.

DISCUSSION:

The SG' s argum.ents are persuasive, particularly as

(

resps do not challenge the differential jurisdiction but rather challenge the
application of law as a denial of equal protection.

It would seem that if they do

not challenge the jurisdiction, the jurisdiction must be assumed to be proper (and
the SG also contends alternatively that it is or can be made so by reinterpretation).
Onc e jurisdiction is established, federal law need not incorporate or be comparable
with state law.
It would also appear that the SG is right that this holding will make applica -

tion of any law confusing in the prosecution of crimes in many reservations within
CA

9.
There is

fo

response.
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UNITED STATES

v.
ANTELOPE, et al.

Q/

A
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~ V ~t~. -~~LA
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Motion- of Respondents X r d F'tancJ
Davi s b n, et al. for leave to Proceed Further
Herein In Forma Pauperis. Also Motion of
Respondents Leonard Francis Davison, et al.
for A]l?.ointment;.._Q f Counsel. Also Motion of
Respondent Gabriel Francis Antelope for Leave
to Proceed Further Herein In Forma Pauperis.
Also Motion of Respondent Gabriel Francis
Antelope for Appointment of Counse 1.

SUMMARY: On February 23, the Court granted cert

e

review its

judgment reversing resps' convictions on grounds that the murder statute contained
in the Major Crimes Act is unconstitutional as applied to resps Indians.

Resps

Leonard Francis Davison and William Andrew Davison request leave to proceed
in forma pauperis and the appointment of John W. Walker, Esq. of Moscow, Idaho,
to represent them in this Court.

Resp Antelope seeks in forma pauperis treatment

and the appointment of Allen V. Bowles, Esq., of Moscow, Idaho, to represent
him in this Court.
As to all three resps, respective counsel state that affidavits in support of
in forn<a pauperis relief have been forwarded for signing to resps and will

- 2 eventually be filed with the Clerk.

Such affidavits appear to be unnecessary as

Mr. Walker (for the Davisons) and Mr. Bowles (for Antelope) were appointed
by both the DC and CA (see, 18 U.S. C. §3006A(d)(6) ).
DISCUSSION: Resps were treated as indigents in both courts below.

More-

over, it appears that they remain incarcerated pending review in this Court.
In forma pauperis relief appears warranted; although, for some reason and

apparently at his own expense, Mr. Bowles filed a printed response in opposition
to cert and a printed brief on the merits.
Attached to resps Davisons' motion for appointment of counsel is a letter
addressed to the Clerk by Mr. Walker explaining that the SG inadvertently failed
to advise counsel for the Davisons of the Government's intention to petition for
cert.

Accordingly, the only response to the SG' s petn was filed by counsel for

Antelope.
Counsel for the Davisons asserts that his clients' interests conflict with
Antelope's on the question of which resp actually caused the death of the victim.
He argues that the Davisons are entitled to be represented by counsel in this
Court.

It should be noted again that the CA appointed counsel for the Davisons

and separate counsel for Antelope.
Inasmuch as Mr. Bowles has already filed a brief on the merits on behalf
of Antelope, counsel for the Davisons should probably be allowed the opportunity
to respond to the SG' s brief on the merits.

However, the issues presented for

review in this Court appear to be common to all three resps and it does not appear
necessary that the Court appoint two attorneys to represent resps.
The Court may wish to direct that the Clerk communicate with both counsel
to request their cooperation in deciding upon one of them to be designated as
appointed counsel in this Court and to present oral argument.

In the alternative,

- 3 Mr. Bowles should probably be appointed to represent all the resps in which
case, if counsel deems it necessary, only a supplemental brief on the merits
need be filed to advance the interests of the Davisons,
There is no response.
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United States v. Gabriel Francis
Antelope, et al.

The respondents, Indians, in the course of robbing a
non-Indian on an Indian reservation in Idaho, murdered the robbery
victim.

Because the accused persons (later convicted) were

Indians, the victim was a non-Indian, and the crimes occurred
in Indian country, and further because the crimes were offenses
specifically enumerated in 18 U.S.C. 1153, the crimes came within
the jurisdiction of the federal district court.
Respondents were indicted and tried on a felony murder
theory, authorized by 18 U.S.C. 1153 and 1111.

Under these federal

provisions, the government's burden of proof was less strict than
under the Idaho homicide statute, which does not contain the felony
murder doctrine.

Thus, under Idaho law a conviction for first-degree

murder would require proof of premeditation and deliberation,
elements not required under the federal felony murder statutes.
Opinion of CA 9
CA 9 sustained respondents' position that the federal
statutes (§§ 1153 and 1111)

~

applied constituted invidious racial

discrimination violative of the Fifth Amendment.

It noted that

if the non-Indian victim had been murdered by a non-Indian, the

I

latter would have been tried under Idaho rather than Federal law;

and under Idaho law, with no provision for felony murder, this
state would have had the heavier burden of proving premeditation
and deliberation.

CA 9 concluded that "the sole basis for the

dispirit treatment of [respondents] is that of race".

And, in

taking note of the government's argument that the issue was one
of federal jurisdiction rather than an invidious classification,
CA 9 said:
"The government should not be permitted to
accomplish through discriminatory jurisdiction
what it cannot do through discriminatory
statutory coverage when both Indian and nonIndian defendants are jurisdictionally covered."
Respondents largely track, with considerable amplification,
the rationale of CA 9.

The brief on behalf of respondents

William and Leonard Davison is considerably better than that
filed on behalf of Antelope.
Position of the Government
The SG, on behalf of the government, denies with more than
usual vigor the existence of racial discrimination.

The alleged

discrimination arises not from any invidious classification but
solely from federal court jurisdiction over some offenses and
-..............

~

not over others.

.._....-.

4iWi'

...

The federal statutes are neutral on their

face:
"The statute under which respondents were convicted
of murder in the first degree, 18 U.S.C. 1111,
applies to all persons charged with homicide in the
special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of

the United States (which, by operation of Sections
1152 and 1153, includes Indian country), regardless
of race, national origin, political status, or any
other characteristic. In other words, any person
who commits murder in the course of a robbery taking
place on a military base or a vessel of the United
States on the high seas -- whether Indian or nonIndian -- is equally liable to conviction for murder
in the first degree. The same is true in the case
of the killing of an Indian in Indian country.
In short, nothing anywhere in the United States
Code affirmatively provides for different treatment
of Indians and non-Indians charged with murder. The
possibility of differential treatment arises only
because, out of the entire universe of murderers
potentially subject to federal court jurisdiction
and to the application of substantive federal law
by virtue of the geographical location of their
offense, one group -- non-Indians who commit crimes
against other non-Indians in Indian country -- is
outside the reach of the present federal statutes
governing crimes committed in Indian country.
(SG's brief, at 13).
Although emphasizing primarily that the statute applies
equally to any homicide within federal criminal jurisdiction
regardless of race of the defendant, the SG also notes that
the regulation of Indian affairs does not derive from race but
rather from the special status of the tribes that we have
emphasized in so many cases.
The SG makes a rather strong policy argument to the
effect that the principle adopted by CA 9 (requiring equality
of penalties imposed by the same crime under federal and state
law) would lead to confusion if not the impossibility of enforcing
criminal law in Indian country.

The decision would require a

comparison of state and federal law to determine which is more
lenient, with federal law to be inapplicable whenever state law
is more lenient.

Indeed, as the SG notes, it is often impossible

to determine which is more lenient.
The SG asserts that, as "a practical matter", if the
analysis of CA 9 is sustained, Congress would be forced either
to assert exclusive federal jurisdiction over all offenses
occurring in Indian country, thereby increasing federal
responsibility beyond the needs of its trusteeship, or to
provide that all offenses be governed by state law -- renouncing
to this extent the supremacy of federal law in Indian country.
Finally, the SG urges that, in the event we agree with
CA 9, we should construe -- to avoid a chaotic result -18

u.s.c.

country.

1152 to include all offenses committed in Indian
It is noted that the first paragraph of § 1152

requires the application of general federal enclave law to all
offenses committed in Indian country, regardless of the identity
of the accused but this Court in McBratney, 104 U.S. 621,
interpreted Congressional intent -- in enacting predecessors
of § 1152 -- as not extending federal jurisdiction to crimes
between non-Indians.

The SG says that if we agree with CA 9

in this case, we should reconsider McBratney and its progeny.
Comment
Although I am not entirely at rest, I am impressed by
the SG's argument that we are dealing here with facially neutral
statutes conferring federal jurisdiction.

The discrimination

if it can be so characterized -- results from the difference
in the laws of different jurisdiction, federal and state.

January 17, 1977
BENCH MEMO
To:

Mr. Justice Powell

From:

Dave Martin

No. 75-661

Bnited Staees v. Antelope

in Indian country
Offenses committed SRXXRaiaRxxexexxaxisRx/are covered
by a complicated set of jurisdictional and substantive
statutes.

The standards to be applied (state law or federal

law) and the forum where the offender will be a tried

(stat~

federal or tribal court) vary--not according to any neat
pattern--depending on the offense and the Indian or
non-Indian status of the offender.

+18•8 ili!R
,1!1:8<

huUialil wurdnud

_,. aan-Tndiae, and feeeral law i:&nteK»e/applied ;n ieeel!t!tl
eenif1ii

It certainly cannot be said that the overall result

ixxgeRexaii~xkaxxkex

generally disadvantages either Indians

or non-Indians by subjecting them to stiffer penalties or
less favorable procedural rules.

And no claim could be

sustained that the whole complicated structure was adopted
with the purpose of harming one group or the other. (Thus
proposed
under the standard articulated in Justice Stewart's/concurrence
in United Jewish Organizations, there is no equal protection
violation--i.e., there has been no purpose to discriminate
in the sense of intent to harm or disadvantage a particular
group.)
But it happens here that these particular defendants
are arguably disadvantaged when compared to a hypothetical
--~-

non-Indian accomplice in the crime who would have been tried

-2in state courts under xxaxa Idaho law.

For Idaho law, unlike

federal law, contains no felony-murder provision.

CA9 held

that this amounted to invidious racial discrimination, and it
therefore struck down resps' convictions.

The question is a

tricky one, but I agree with the SG that CA9 should be reversed.
~
Cur rent
The key issue is whether the axxaxxi~RX8f/federal jurisdictional pattern is con&itutionally valid, for it is only
in the jurisdictional pattern that there is any "racial"
distinction. There is no distinction based on race in the
murder
substantive/provisions tm t apply. All murderers within federal
~Hxxi

jurisdiction, regardless of race, are subject to the

------

felony murder rule.

[This fact distinguishes cases such as

United States v. Cleveland, 503 F.2d 1067 (CA9 1974).

There

Indian defendants were charged with assault with a deadly
weapon.
§

~ixiaxiixY~8~R~xSxll3~x~

They came within 18 U.S.C.

1153, which at that time provided for punishment of that

crime in accordance with state law--albeit in federal court and
as a matter of federal law.

A non-Indian committing the same

crime would have come within§ 1152--i.e., still within federal
court and federal law--, but § 1152 provides for application
of specific federal law, 18 U.S.C. § 113, to assaults.
possible

pun~hment

The

under § 113 was substantially less.

court found this to be invidious discrimination. --

The

I think

I agree with that result, because there federal substantive
law applied to both Indian and non-Indian defendants, but
harshness of penalty varied based only on the "race" of the
offender.

Such a difference is more overt and more offensive

than the iR£iaaRxal difference involved here, which stems only
incidentally from the fact of limited federal jurisdiction.

-3-

I am not sure I have expressed the difference adequately,
but the pmint is that Cleveland is distinguishable.

Moreover,

Congress has acted, in Pub. L. No. 94-297, to remedy the
discrimination Cleveland condemned.
( ~ Cl"fY i'S appst- AQ.(,)
bearing on our case~

The new statate has no

Although the issue has never been squarely decided,
it seems fairly clear that Congress could have exerted federal
jurisdiction over all offenses committed in Indian country.
However, in a line of cases beginning with U.S. v. McBratney,
104 U.S. 621, this court has construed the relevant acts so
that a state retains jurisdiction over such offenses when
committed by a non-Indian on a non-Indian victim.

The question

here is really whether confining jurisdiction in that way is
inevitable
permissible when the/effect is occasionally to disadvantage
sRxg one group or the other.
If this is to be treated as a strictly racial line,
therefore subject to strictest serutiny, then CA9 was probably
right.

I have no doubt but that the Court would strike down

a hypothetical statute subjecting ail offenses on military
bases to federal jurisdiction, except when the offender was

xkixH¥ black.

Drawing that kind of a black-white line would

be highly offensive, but perhaps more to the point, it would
be irrational.

It simply could not serve any legitimate

purpose, nor has it any respectable historical antecedents.
the SG
It could not stand~ even if ix/could kH show that state law
was uniformly more favorable to the black defendants.

-4But I do not think xkix the

discri ~ inatio~would--or

should--be considered equally pernicious as the black-white
discrimination just hypothesized.

There are two possible

grounds for not finding the line drawn here to be "racial"
in the sense that it calls for strictest scrutiny.

(1) Not

all racial Indians are considered Indians under § 1153.

This

point is made in Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 553-554.
Blood
Aindians not recognized as part of federally protected tribes
would not be included.

The SG makes this point, but I do not

think it deserves great reliance.

For one thing, axRsRxlRaiaR

someone without Indian blood can apP.arently not be considerel
().<;. "'· ~" 'f.r v.s. S"t7.
an Indian under the statute even if so recogn~zed by a tribe.A
Moreover, it seems quite a difficult thing for someone once
recognized as an Indian to disaffiliate.

So the class may not

be strictly racial--and this is not unimportant--but it still
has many of the characteristics that make us uneasy about
racial classifications.
(2)

Moret important is simply the history of this

nation's relations with the Indians.

A number of our cases

emphasize that relationship is "unique," "anomalous," or
"sui generis."

Without this history one might well be called

~.s ~tAoS~
upon to treatAthis aix differential treatment based on
Indian-ness)~

applies.

easpec~

but with it, a different standard

It was stated in Mancari, 417 U.S., at 555: "As

long as the special treatment can be tied rationally to the
fulfillment of Congress' unique obligation toward the Indians,
such legislative judgments will not be distnrbed."

This standard

-5-

was applied in a jurisdictional setting just last term in
v

Fisher v. fDistrict Court, 424 U.S. 382, 390-391, sustaining
the differential jurisdiction.
I think the jurisdictional pattern here is rationally
tied to Congress' obligation.

It makes sense for Congress

to take federal jurisdiction when Indians are involved as
perpetrators or victims, for then tribal matters are closely
implicated.

When no Indians are involved, the xxihalxliRkx

impact on tribal matters is less direct, and Congress could
rationally conclude that such matters should be left to
state authority.

That in some cases this pattern will incidenmlly

result in somewhat harsher rules being applied to Indian
offenders does not make it irritional.

D.M.

PUBLIC LAW 94-297 [S. 2129]; May 29, 1976

INDIAN CRIMES ACT OF 1976
For Legislat-ive History of Act, seep. 1641
to

'"

An Act to provide for the definition and punishment of certain crimes in
accordance with the Federal laws in force within the special mari·
time and territorial jurisdiction of the United States when said crimes
are committed by an ·Indian in order to insure equal treatm ent for
Indian and non-Indian offendera.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
United States of America in Congress assembled, That this Act may
be cited as the "Indian Crimes Act of 1976".
SEC. 2. Section 1153, title 18, United States Code, is amended to
read as follows:
"§ 1153. Offenses committed within Indian country
"A:rcy Indian who commits against the person or property of
another Indian or other person any of the following offenses, namely,
murder, manslaughter, kidnaping, rape, carnal knowledge of any
female, not his wlfe, who has not attained the age of sixteen years,
assault with intent to commit rape, incest, assault with intent to commit murder, assault with a dangerous weapon, assault resulting in
serious bodily injury, arson, burglary, robber}', and larceny within
the Indian country, shall be subject to the same laws and penalties
as all other persons committi~~ any of the a.bove offenses, w1thin the
exclusive jurisdiction of the united States.
"As used in this section, the offenses of burglary and incest shall
be defined and punished in accordance with the laws of the State in
which such offense was committed as are in force at the time of such
offense.
"In addition to the offenses of burglary and incest, any other of the
above offenses which are not defined and punished by Federal law in
force within the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States shall be
defined and punished in :u:cordance with the laws of the State in
which such offense was committed as are in force at the time of such
offense.".
,
·
·
SEc. 3. Section 113 of title 18, United States Code, is amended by
addini at the end thereof the following new subsection:
'
"(f Assault resulting in serious bodily injury, by fine of not more
than 10,000 or imprisonment for not more than ten years, or both.".

90 STAT. 585

Indian Crimes
Act of 1976.
18 usc ll53
note.

Assault, penalties.

P.L. 94-297

LAWS OF 94th CON G.-2nd SESS.

May 29

SEc. 4. Sedion 3242, title 18, United States Code, is amended to
read as follows:
"§ 3242. Indians committing certain offenses; acts on reservations
"All Indians committing a:ny offense listed in the first paz-agraph
of and punishable under section 1'153 (relating to offenses committed
, within Indian country) of this title shall be tried in the same courts
and in the same manner as are all other persons committing such
offense within the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States.".

Approved May 29, 1976.

PUBLIC LJl

AUTHORIZA'
ONE
An Act to authorize f1
Quality.

Be it enacted by
United States of An
the Environmental
4-374) is amended to
"SEc. 205. There :
operations of the 0
on Environmental (
following fiscal wa
in Public Law 91':_19
" (a) $2,000,0
" (b) $1'>00,001
tember 30, 197
" (c) $3,000,0
" (d) $3,000,C
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY:

Approved Ma

HOUSE REPORT No. 94-1038 (Comm. on the Judiciary).
SENATE REPORT No. 94-620 (Comm. on the Judiciary).
CCNGRESSIONAL RECORD, Vol. 122 (1976):
Feb. 4 1 considered and passed Senate.
May 18 1 considered and passed House, amended.
May 20, Senate concurred in House amendment.
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The question presented by our

J·ua L • au

gra ~1-

Jus-Lies 3te

of certiorari is whether, under .the
From: The Chief

4

Jus;~cc

ci~- C::~. \

stances of this case, federal criminal statutes

APR 1 1 1917

Circulat ed: __________

violate the· Due Process Clause of the Fiftf
Amendment by subjecting individuals to

_

J

z/t J zt11

by virtue of their
as Indians.
(1)

.
•

..::~~·
;-rtf

-/o ., j..~ ~ c.,-u.
~ ·~

I

On the night of February 18, 1974,
respondents, enrolled Coeur d 1 Alene Indians,
broke into the home of Emma Johnson, an 81-year

tJ-:1

IR'v.s:c.

old non-Indian, in Worley, Idaho; they

£ t~~ -~~ ~obbed and killed Mrs. Johnson.

~ w~1 ,.

~ ·~ ~

.

-'~

-1

~

'

~r-~-

'ft. . --;I ·;:; ~
\..'3
1\ · &",

.

()_ . "' ~

#......~:
541'.... •..&

~

i:L..
~

.

Reservation, respondents were subject

to federal jurisdiction under the Major Crimes

'•.s;.,...J2...Act.

~

the boundaries of the Coeur d'Alene

~

fJ 1 1.
~ .,-c..

~8 u.s.c.

.

tt

·'-'~~

§

1153.

They were,

on charges of burglary, robbery and murder.-

~. of

z

y

accord1ngly, indicted by a federal grand j u~~

"- ~ ._,.A,_ . ~..,__.,.J
.
Respondent

i.l~P.L . ~

Because the

crimes were committed by enrolled Indians

l ~) ~ f· r-; ~·tfl...
,, l ~v::·thin
~ffl~·
~ ndian

sez

William Davison was convicted

d-degree murder only.

~

Respondents

t'f) ~
.y-. ~ ~ ab(/el Francis Antelope and Leonard Davison
~ ··~ .. •t--v. ~'fo ~v.N.C. ~~v. ;e._.
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were found guilty of all three crimes as
charged, including first-degree murder under
'

the felony-murder provisions of 18 U.S.C.
3/
§ 1111,- as made applicable to enrolled
Indians by 18 U.S.C.

§

1153.

(2)
In the United States Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit, respondents contended
that their felony murder convictions were
unlawful as products of invidious racial
discrimination.

They argued that a non-Indian

charged with

precisely the same offense,

namely the murder of another non-Indian within
4/
Indian country,- would have been subject to
prosecution only under Idaho law, which
in contrast to the federal murder statute,
18 U.S.C.

1111, does not contain a felony
5/
murder provision.- To establish the crime of
§

first-degree murder in state court, therefore,
Idaho would have had to prove premeditation
and deliberation.

No such elements were

required under the felony-murder component
of 18

u.s.c.

§

1111.

Because of the difference between Idaho
and federal law, the Court of Appeals concluded
~-

that respondents · were "put at a serious
racially ~based

disadvantage," 523 F.2d 400,

-3-

406 (CA 9 1975), since the federal government
was not required to establish premeditation
~

and deliberation in respondents' federal
prosecution.

This disparity, so the Court

of Appeals concluded, violated equal protection requirements implicit in the Due Process
Clause of the Fifth Amendment.

We granted

fueUnited States' petition for certiorari,
424 U.S. 907 (1976), and we reverse.
(3)

The decisions of this Court leave no
doubt that federal legislation with respect
to Indian tribes, although relating to
Indians as such, is not based upon impermissible
racial classifications.

Quite the contrary,

classifications expressly singling out Indian
tribes as subjects of legislation are expressly

6/
provided for in the Constitution . - and supported
by the ensuing history of the Federal Government's relations with Indians.
" .•. Indian tribes are unique aggregations possessing attributes of sovereignty over both their members and
their territory, Worcester v. Georgia,
6 Pet. 515, 557 (1832); they are 'a
separate people' possessing the power
of regulating their internal and
social relations ..•• '" United States
v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 557 (1975).
Legislation with respect to these "unique
aggregations" has repeatedly been sustained by

,..

-4-

..

this Court against claims of unlawful racial
discrimination.

In upholding a limited
,..

employment preference for Indians in the Bureau
of Indian Affairs, we said in Morton v. Mancari,
417

u.s.

535 (1974):
"Literally every piece of legislation
dealing with Indian tribes and
reservations .•. single out for special
treatment a constituency of tribal
Indians living on or near reservations.
If these laws ... were deemed invidious
racial discrimination, an entire Title
of the United States Code (25 u.s.c.)
would be effectively erased .•.. " Id.,
at 552.
-

In light of thafresult, the Court unanimously
concluded in Mancari:
"The preference, as applied,is
granted to Indians not as a discrete
racial group, but, rather, as members
of quasi-sovereign tribal entities ..•. "
Id., at 554.
Last Term, in Fisher v. District Court, 424 U.S.
382 (1976), we held that members of the Northern
Cheyenne Tribe could be denied access to
Montana state courts in connection with an
adoption proceeding arising on their Reservation.
Unlike Mancari, the Indian plaintiffs in Fisher
were being denied a benefit or privilege
available to non-Indians; nevertheless, a
unanimous Court dismissed the claim of racial
discrimination:
"Finally, we reject the argument
that denying [the Indian plaintiffs]
access to the Montana courts constitutes

----~--o;;J·----

---

..

"

,·

f

impermissible racial discrimination.
The exclusive jurisdiction of the
Tribal Court does not derive from
the race of the plaintiff but rather
from the quasi-sovereign status of
the Northern Cheyenne Tribe under
federal law." ,424 U.S., at 390.
Both Mancari and Fisher involved preferences or disabilities directly promoting
Indian interests in self-government, whereas
in the present case we are dealing not with
matters of tribal self-regulation, but with
federal regulation of criminal conduct within
Indian country implicating Indian interests.
But the principles reaffirmed in Mancari and
Fisher point more broadly to the conclusion
that federal regulation of Indian affairs is
not based upon impermissible classifications.
Rather, such regulation is rooted in the unique
status of Indians as "a separate people"
with their own political institutions.

Federal

regulation of Indians, therefore, is governance
of @[e remnants

~ce-sovereign

political

communities; it is not to be viewed as legislation of a "'racial' group consisting of
'Indians •.•• '"
at 553 n.24.

Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S.,
Indeed,

respondents were

not subjected to federal criminal jurisdiction
because they are of the Indian race but
because they were enrolled members of the

7/
Coeur d'Alene Tribe.-

We therefore con-

elude that federal criminal statutes enforced
here are based" neither in wholeror in part
upon impermissible racial classifications.
l~)
The challenged statutes do not otherwise

8/
violate equal protection.-

We have previously

observed that Indians indicted under the Major
Crimes Act enjoy the same procedural benefits
and privileges as all other persons within
federal jurisdiction.

Keeble v. United States,

4 12 U . S . 2 0 5 , 212 ( 19 7 3 ) .

See (U . S . C .

§

3242 •

Respondents were, therefore, subjected to
the same body of law as any other

individual,

Indian or non-Indian, charged with first-degree

9/
murder committed in a federal enclave.-

They

do not, and could not, contend otherwise.

There remains, then, only the disparity
between federal and Idaho law as the basis for
10/
respondents' equal protection claim.--Since
Congress has undoubted constitutional power
to prescribe a criminal code applicable in
Indian country, United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S.
375 (1886), it is of no consequence that the
federal scheme - differs from a state criminal _
code otherwise applicable within the
boundaries of the State of Idaho.

Under our

-

7 -

.'

federal system, the National Government does
not violate equal protection when its own
11/
body of law is even-handed-,- regardless of
the laws of States with respect to the same
12/
subject matter.-The federal government treated respondents
in the same manner as all other persons within
federal jurisdiction, pursuant to a regulatory
scheme that did not erect impermissible
racial classifications; hence, no violation
of the Due Process Clause infected respondents'
13/
convictions.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is
reversed and the cause remanded for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Reversed and remanded.

Footnotes -1

y
18 U.S.C. 1153 provides in pertinent part:
"Any Indian who commits against the person
or property of another Indian or other person any
of the following off e nses, namely, murder, mans laughte
rape, carnal knowledge of any female, not his wife,
who has not attained the age of sixteen years, assault
with intent to commit rape, incest, assault with
intent to kill, assault with a dangerous we a pon,
assault resulting in serious bodily injury, arson,
burglary, robbery, and larceny within the Indian
country, shall be subject to the same laws and penalties as all other persons committing any o f the above
offenses, within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
United States."
The background leading up to enactment of the Major Crimes Act is
discussed in Keeble v. United States, 412 U.S. 205, 209-212 (197 3
As noted in that case, the Government has characterized the Major
Crime Act as "a carefully limited intrusion of federal power into
the otherwise exclusive jurisdiction of the Indian tribes to
punish Indians for crimes committed on Indian land."

Id., at 209

?:_I
Except for the offenses enumerated in the Major Crimes Act, all
crimes committed by enrolled Indians against other Indians within
Indian country are subject to the jurisdiction .Jf tribal courts.
18 U.S.C.

§

1152.

Not all crimes committed within Indian country

are subject to federal or

tr~

jurisdiction, however.

Under

United States v. McBratney, 104 U.S. 621 (1881), a non-Indian

/

charged with committing crimes against other non-Indians in India
country is subject to prosecution under state law. S.t.~~... c;t.JU'V

VIr

·Jtt~,

'}./

18 U.S.C. §1111 is the federal murder statute.

It provides

in pertinent part:
"(a) Murder is the unlawful killing of a
human being with malice aforethought. Every
murder perpetrated by poison, lying in wait, or
any other kind of willful, deliberate, malicious,
and premeditated killing; or committed in the
perpetration of, or attempt to perpetrate, any
arson, rape, burglary, or robbery; or perpetrated
from a premeditated design unlawfully and maliciously
to effect the death of any human being other than him
who is killed, is murder in the first degree.
Any other murder is murder in the second degree.
It should be noted that respondent William Davison was
convicted only of second-degree murder, not felony murder, under
18

u.s.c.

§1111.

See n.2, supra.

Federal law ostensibly extends federal

jurisdiction to all crimes occurring in Indian country, except
offenses subject to tribal jurisdiction.

18 U.S.C. §1152.

However,

under United States v. McBratney, supra, and cases that followed,
this Court construed §1152 and its predecessors as not applying
to crimes by non-Indians against other non-Indians.

Thus, respondents

correctly argued that, had the perpetrators of the crimes been
non-Indians the courts of Idaho would have had jurisdiction over
these charges.
~/

Idaho statutes contain the following definition of first-

degree murder:
"All murder which is perpetrated by means of
poison, or lying in wait, torture, or by any other
kind of wilful, deliberate, and premeditated
killing is murder of the first degree. Any murder
of any peace officer of this state or of any
municipal corporation or political subdivision
thereof, when the officer is acting in line of duty,
shall be murder in the first degree. *** All other
kinds of murder are ot the second degree." Idaho
Code §18-4003 (1975 Cum. Supp.).

Footnotes - 3.

5/-cont.
Idaho law provides for a mandatory death sentence for first-

v.
~/

N . e:. .

Article I, §8, of the Constitution gives Congress power

"[t]o regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the
several States, and with the Indian tribes."

?_I

As was true in Mancari, federal jurisdiction under the

Major Crimes Act does not apply to "many individuals who are
racially to be classified as 'Indians.'" 417 U.S., at 553 n.24.
Thus, the prosecution in this case offered proof that r e spondents
were enrolled members of the Coeur d'Alene Tribe and thus not
emancipated from tribal relations.

Moreover, members of Tribes

whose official status has been terminated by congressional
enactment are no longer subject, by virtue of their status, to
federal criminal jurisdiction under the Major Crimes Act.
States v. Heath, 509 F.2d 16, 19

United

(CA 9 1974) ('While anthropologically

a Klamath Indian even after the Termination Act obviously remains
an Indian, his unique status vis-a-vis the Federal Government no
longer exists.•) In addition, as enrolled tribal members, respondents
were subjected to federal jurisdiction only because their crimes

/

\

\

""';o:

r"
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Indianl\. Reser ~at-ion. Iff 0.).<'.{11.\/,
Crimes occurring elsewhere would not be subject to exclusive
federal jurisdiction.
392, 397 n.ll (1968).

Puyallup Tribe v. Department of Game, 391 U.S.

Footnotes - "'

2_/-cont.
It should be noted, however, that enrollment in an official
Tribe has not been held to be an absolute requirement for federal
jurisdiction, at least where the Indian defendant lived on the
reservation and "maintained tribal relations with the Indians
thereon."

Ex parte Pero, 99 F.2d 28, 30 (CA 7 1938).

United States v. Ives, 504 F.2d 935, 953 (CA 9 1974)

See also
(dicta).

Since

respondents are enrolled tribal members, we are not called on to
decide whether non-enrolled Indians are subject to 18 U.S.C.

§1153~

and we therefore intimate no views on the matter.

~/

Other than their argument

t~at

the federal statutes create

an invidious racial classification, respondents do not seriously
contend that application of federal law to Indian tribes is so
irrational as to deny equal protection.

See n.6, supra ~

They do

point, however, to Congress' relinquishment of criminal jurisdiction over Indians in six States pursuant to P.L. 280, 18 U.S.C.
§1162.

But P.L. 280 is simply one manifestation of Congress'

continuing concern with the welfare of Indian tribes under federal
guardianship.

Indeed, in adopting P.L. 280, Congress 3ingled out

certain Reservations to remain subject to federal criminal jurisdiction.

Congress' selective approach in P.L. 280 reinforces,

rather than undermines, the conclusion that legislation directed
(_~<\d
4o~wara Indian tribes is a necessary and appropriate consequence
of federal guardianship under the Constitution.

Antelope

Footnotes - 5.

Federal jurisdiction would extend to crimes, regardless
of the race of the perpetrator or victim, committed on federal
enclaves, such as military installations, or on vessels of the
United States on the high seas.

lQ/
Respondents base their equal-protection claim on the
assumption that they have been disadvantaged by being prosecuted
under federal law.

In their view, their murder convictions were

made more likely by the fact that federal prosecutors were not
required to prove premeditation.

Respondents essentially ignore,

however, the fact that Idaho law provided the death penalty for
first-degree murder, whereas federal law provides for life
imprisonment as the maximum sentence.
'

Moreover, they do not

'

seriously question that the evidence adduced at their federal
trial might well have supported a finding of premeditation and
deliberation, since respondents were found to have beaten and
kicked Mrs. Johnson to death during the course of a planned
robbery.

Under these circumstnVces, it is largely a matter of

speculation whether, and to what extent, respondents have been
"disadvantaged" at all by be1ng prosecuted under federal law.

It should be noted, however, that this Court has consistently upheld federal regulations aimed solely at tribal Indians,
as opposed to all persons subject to federal jurisdiction.
~.,United

See,

States v. Holliday, 3 Wall. 407, 417-418 (1866);

Footnotes - 6.

1!_1-cont.
Perrin v. United States, 232

u.s.

478, 482 (1914).

Rosebud Sioux Tribe v.Kneip, Slip opinion, at 30 n.47

See also
(1977).

Indeed, the Constitution itself provides support for legislation
directed specifically at the Indian tribes.

See n.6 supra.

As

the Court noted in Morton v. Mancari, supra, the Constitution
therefore "singles Indians out as a proper subject for separate
legislation."

417 U.S., at 552.

In this regard, we are not concerned with instances in
which Indians tried in federal court are subjected to differing

l o.~~/e

penalties and burdens of proof from those &p~eft to nonIndians charged with the same offense.

Compare United States v.

Big Crow, 523 F.2d 955 (CA 8 1976), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 920
(1976), and United States v. Cleveland, 503 F.2d 1067 (CA 9 1974),
with United States v. Analla, 490 F.2d 1204 (CA 10), vacated, 419

u.s.

813 (1974).

See P.L. 94-297 (1976)

(which provides for

uniform penalties for both Indians and non-Indians charged with
assault resulting in serious bodily injury).

lY

That issue is not

Indeed, had respondents been prosecuted under state law,

they may well have argued, under this Court's holding in Seymour
v. Superintendent, 368 U.S. 351 (1962), that the state conviction
was void for want of jurisdiction.

In Seymour, an enrolled member

of the Colville Indian Tribe was convicted in state court of
attempted burglary within Indian country.
state conviction, this Court held:

In reversing the

F'OOt:nu t.co
r

1~/-cont.

"Since the burglary with which
petitioner was charged occurred on
property . . . within the .
[Indian]
reservation, the courts of Washington
had no jurisdiction to try him for that
offense." Id., at 359.
If state courts would have had no jurisdiction over respondents'
case, then state law does not constitute a meaningful point of
reference for establishing a claim of equal protection.

1~/

If we accepted respondents' contentions, persons charged

with crimes on federal military bases or other federal enclaves
could demand that their federal prosecfBAons be governed by state
law to the extent that state law was more "lenient" than federal
law.
ship.

The Constitution does not authorize this kind of gamesmanIndeed, any such rule, even assuming its workability, is

flatly inconsistent with the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution,
Art. VI, cl. 2.

Moreover, many of this Court's decisions invalidate

attempts by the States to regulate Indian interests within the
Reservations.

As the Court stated in McClanahan v. Arizona State

Tax Commission 411 U.S. 164, 170-17l,"'State laws generally are
not applicable to tribal Indians on an Indian reservation except
where Congress has expressly provided that State laws shall apply.'"
See also, Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. Kneip, Slip opinion, at
'Q9cided April

~(1977).
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Dear Chief:
Please join me.
I do bave two or three minor suggestions that I have
noted on the enclosed copy of your opinion.

,,

'\

Sincerely,
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the Chief Justice"
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CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS

April 12, 1977

Re:

75-661 - United States v. Antelope

Dear Chief:
Please join me.
Respectfully,

The Chief Justice
Copies to the Conference

.'

j;upumt Qfllltlillf tlrt~b j;mttg
'Jllfrur~ 19. <!J. zo~n.~
CHAMBERS OF

.JUSTICE POTTER STEWART

April 13, 1977

j

Re: No. 75-661, United States v. Antelope
Dear Chief,
I am glad to join your opinion for the Court
in this case.
Sincerely yours,
, '"
'.

•.1·

The Chief Justice
Copies to the Conference

.'·,

.

Qf01trl .Ltf t4t ~tb, ~taftg
._rutlp:ttghm. ~. <!f. 2llgt~~

~u:prtnU

CHAMBERS OF

.JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST

April 13, 1977

Re:

No. 75-661 - United States v. Antelope

Dear Chief:
A propos our discussion of your circulating opinion
in the above entitled case this afternoon, I offer the
following language as a substitute for present footnote 9.
I think in light of difficult and undecided questions as
to the extent of the jurisdiction of Indian tribal courts
and the like, it is important to cite cases such as those
included in the proposed substitute footnote, not to
make anything out of them in this case, but simply to show
that they remain good law and that the language which you
necessarily use in your opinion about Indian "sovereignty"
is not to be taken with complete literalness.
Since Lewis indicated in his join letter to you that
re was also suggesting minor changes, I am taking the
liberty of sending a copy of this letter to him.
Sincerely,
>

('tl·

j./

The Chief Justice
Copy to:

Mr. Justice Powell

r.r

4/13/77
Proposed addition to Antelope, footnote 9
_/

Congress has provided for federal jurisdiction

over the crime of murder on the reservation, much as on
other federal enclaves, 18 U.S.C. § 1111, 1153.

But as

our opinions have recognized that Indian reservations differ
in certain respects from other federal enclaves, the statute
has been construed as not encompassing crimes on the reservation by non-Indians against non-Indians.

United States v.

McBratney, 104 U.S. 621 (1881); see Surplus Trading Co.
v. Cook, 281

u.s.

647, 651 (1930); Williams v. Lee, 358

U.S. 217, 219-220 (1959); McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax
Comm., 411 U.S. 164, 171 (1973).

The statute does not

single out Indian defendants; non-Indian defendants are also
covered if the victim was a member of the tribe.

.:%u:prtm~ QJ~nrt
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CHAMBERS OF

.JUSTICE BYRON R. WHITE

April 14, 1977

Re:

No. 75-661 - United States v. Antelope

Dear Chief:
Please join me.
Sincerely,

The Chief Justice
Copies to Conference

·.•

~uprtmt

Qfttud ttf tqt 'J!lnitt.b ~tatt~
'J.iaglyingtttn. ~. <q. 21lbl'l-~

_,·

CHAMBERS Of"

THE CHIEF" JUSTICE

.•

April 14, 1977

MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE:
Re:

75-661 United States v. Antelope

Enclosed is the first print draft of the opinion.
Further reflection suggests to me that I should omit the
tangential references to the death penalty potential.
Notes 5, 10, and 13 have been modified by excisions,
and a small addition is added to Note 9 for emphasis.
There is no substantive change from the typed copy
circulated on April 11.
Regards,

-

<qanri of tltl' ~ttitcb .,§ifa.ttg
'Jlag Jrl:n¢01t. tB. <q. zogTJ.J..;t

.:§u:p-uutt

CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE HARRY A. BLACKMUN

Re:

April 14, 1977

No . 75-661 - United States v. Antelope

Dear Chief:
Please join me .

The Chief Justice
cc:

The Conference
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CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE WM. J . BRENNAN, JR.

April 14, 1977

·'

RE: No. 76-661

United States v. Antelope

Dear Chief:
.,

I agree.
Sincerely,

The Chief Justice
cc: The Conference
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, April 14, 1977
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No. 75-661 ' United States v. Antelope
Dear Chief:
I would be. ·happy to have you add the footnote suggested

....,

,.

in Bill ·R ehnquist's letter of April 13.
Sincerely,

~

'if

The Chief Justice
lfp/sa
cc:

Mr. Justice Rebnquis t
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CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST

April 15, 1977
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Re:

No. 75-661 - United States v. Antelope
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Dear Chief:
Please join me.
Sincerely,
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The Chief Justice
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Copies to the Conference
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April 15, 1977

JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL

Re: No: 75-661, United States v. Antelope

Dear Chief:
Please join me.
Sincerely,
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T. M.
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The Chief Justice
cc:

The Conference

~I'

"'
~ c~ll.ll~i;-J__+--+--r--t----r-rt.

~

'\J

~

~ ~

t~

-

.

>

.
.

Cf.l

-

-

